At the beginning of the 20^th Century, the area that is today known as the Palestinian Territories and Israel (Historic Palestine) had a population of less than 1 million people.  This population mainly relied on traditional rain-fed farming techniques for food production, only practicing very limited irrigation, and did not place a strain on the water resources that sustained them.  Where farms were situated close to springs, fields were irrigated by water conveyed from the springs to the fields along open dirt canals by simple gravitation (without pumps).  Along the coast, underground water was raised from shallow wells with the help of 'norias' (bucket-type water-wheels) driven by donkey or ox.  Such wells were dug manually and the output was low¹.  As the 20^th Century progressed, large political, cultural and demographic upheavals in the region radically altered water use patterns, and the right to use, develop and control water resources became an important concern affecting the relations between the people and countries of the region.  Key in this process was the rise of Zionism and high levels of Jewish immigration to the area, culminating in the creation of the State of Israel.

The Zionist movement began in the late 18^th century, but only gained popularity in the late 19^th to early 20^th centuries, when Baron Edmond James de Rothschild and other Jewish philanthropists began buying land in Palestine and financing Jewish agricultural settlements and industrial enterprises. These ventures provided a haven for Jews fleeing Tsarist Russia at a time when anti-Semitism and pogroms were escalating, and driving millions to flee².  The ‘First Aliyah’ (major wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine) took place between 1882 and 1903, and is estimated to have included between 25,000 and 35,000 people.  The World Zionist Organization was founded at the First Zionst Congress in Basel, Austria in 1897, and the Jewish National Fund (which was in charge of land acquisition in Palestine) was founded at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901³.  Immigration of Jews to Palestine continued throughout the early decades of the 20^th century, spurred on by upheavals and mounting anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia, culminating in the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust.   According to the UN, by 1946 there were approximately 608,000 Jews living in Palestine⁴. 

Many early Zionist settlers were guided by a strong ‘back-to-the-soil’ ethos, as well as an ideological commitment to ‘redeeming’ or ‘improving’ the land⁵.  This led them to form agricultural settlements, and to introduce new farming techniques reliant on high inputs of water.  The success of the Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine was central to the success of the Zionist movement, because it was linked to the ability of the country to absorb more Jewish immigrants.  During the British Mandate period, several attempts were made to restrict Jewish immigration to Palestine (including the Passfield White Paper of 1930, and the 1939 White Paper), based on the argument that there were not enough natural resources to support further growth of the existing population⁶.  Part of the Zionist strategy for countering this policy was to show that with development and stewardship, the land could support a much larger population⁷.  In addition, successful agricultural settlements could provide jobs for new immigrants, money to support them and food to feed them.  More water would allow the establishment of more settlements, and thus the absorption of more immigrants.  Thus for political, ideological and practical reasons, Zionists developed a keen interest in developing the water resources of the area. 

As early as 1919, Zionist leaders began seeking advice on irrigation techniques and watershed management from experts in the United States, as well as lobbying the British and French governments (who controlled Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria at the time) to include water resources such as the Litani River in south Lebanon and the Yarmouk River in Jordan, as well as the headwaters of the Jordan River, within the boundaries of the potential Jewish State⁸.  Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the Zionists invited many renowned hydrologists to the area to help them carry out hydrological surveys and create comprehensive plans for water development.  Perhaps the most famous of these was the Lowdermilk Plan, which proposed using the water of the Jordan, Yarmouk and Zarqa Rivers as well as the Jordan headwaters (Hasbani, Banias and Dan Rivers) to irrigate the Jordan Valley and Northern Palestine (including the Galilee area).  Lowdermilk also suggested damming the Litani River to form an artificial lake in northern Palestine that could be pumped southward to irrigate the Negev Desert⁹.  

A vitally important figure for Jewish water development during this time was Levi Eshkol, later to become Prime Minister of Israel.  Between 1935 and 1938, together with Simcha Blass, Eshkol spearheaded an effort to design and build the first large-scale water project in the region: a conveyance project transferring water under pressure in steel pipes from 3 wells in the flanks of the Jezreel Valley to irrigate fields by sprinkler system, superseding the old flood irrigation method.  In 1937 he founded and became the first Director General of the Mekorot Water Company, which today is the National Water Company of Israel¹⁰. 

During the same period, Arab farmers did not benefit from anything close to the support and expertise at the disposal of their Zionist counterparts.  Prior to the British Mandate and particularly during World War I, the population and the environment were impoverished by the ravages of Ottoman occupation.  Taxes were high and farmers struggled with debt; terraces fell into disrepair and farming became increasingly subsistence based¹¹.   The Palestinian rural economy was in decline, and farmers lacked the substantial capital and technology necessary to expand or improve their agriculture¹².  During the British Mandate, several schemes were implemented attempting to revive the agricultural sector in Palestine.  However, the sums allocated by the British for financial relief barely scratched the surface of the fellaheen's needs, particularly since the earnings of one-quarter of the Muslim rural population in 1931 were below the subsistence level¹³.  Furthermore, the farmers themselves were often reluctant to participate in British schemes due to distrust of the authorities, and suspicion of British colonial aspirations¹⁴.  Jewish farmers on the other hand were much more willing to participate in Mandate development plans; and water development, particularly in relation to agriculture, became almost an exclusively Zionist preserve¹⁵.

Zionist agricultural projects were not only high input in terms of water.  They also required application of large amounts of synthetic fertilizers.  Fertilizer imports jumped from 1,077 tons in 1922 to a peak of 14,698 tons in 1937¹⁶.  This had important consequences for the quality of groundwater reserves years later, as the nitrates seeped down through the soil towards the water supplies below.  It is also worth noting that in 1933, on the advice of American water expert Elwood Mead, the British Mandatory government carried out a hydrological survey of groundwater resources.  They found that the Coastal Aquifer was being overused, and water quality was suffering¹⁷.  However, attempts to limit water use in this region sparked angry protests from both Jewish and Arab farmers, and so were abandoned.  Thus it is clear that water mismanagement in the area has a long history, and also that in order to increase agricultural production on the Coastal Plain and further south, it would be necessary to bring more water in from an external source.  Zionists had plans to do exactly that, but were unable to implement them until after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

The birth of the State of Israel (known to the Palestinians as the ‘Nakba’ meaning ‘Disaster’) produced large upheavals in the distribution of human populations in the region, which had far reaching consequences in terms of resource use.  By 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was providing aid to over 900 000 registered Palestinian refugees, who had fled from the area that became Israel¹⁸.  Between 1948 and 1950, the population of Gaza jumped from around 82,000 to close to 240,000, while the West Bank population increased from approximately 462,000 to about 765,000¹⁹ (other refugees sought sanctuary in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan). This massively increased pressure on the water resources of Gaza and the West Bank, both through direct domestic consumption of water by refugees, and through increasing demand for food, promoting more intensive and more extensive agriculture. 

Providing infrastructure to serve the refugee population presented the Jordanian and Egyptian administrations, who took over control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively, with a severe challenge.  It should also be noted that such a sudden increase in the population bases in the West Bank, and particularly in Gaza where the increase was almost fourfold, laid the foundations for a much higher population growth than would otherwise have been the case in those areas, straining natural resources and capacity to provide infrastructure and services.  The effects of this strain are still in evidence in the Palestinian Territories today. 

Within the new State of Israel, tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants began to arrive, eager to consolidate their hold over their new national home.  By 1949 the Jewish population had reached over one million, an increase of some 400,000 on 1946 numbers²⁰.  With statehood came the ability to put into action some of the water development plans that Zionists had been preparing with such care in the preceding decades.   Attaining food security was a strategic and ideological priority for the young state, and this increased the drive to expand agricultural development.  In five years, during the 1950s, cultivated areas increased by 150 %, with the increase in irrigated plots being even higher.  During this period, agricultural settlement doubled, with the number of farming communities rising from 300 to 600²¹.  The expansion of agriculture was largely made possible by water development.  During Israel’s first decade, some 80% of infrastructure development went into water works and carriers [1] .  In addition, several swamps were drained (most notably the Huleh swamp in 1951), in order to increase the amount of cultivable land²³.  These drainage projects had dramatic effects on the biodiversity and functioning of wetland ecosystems²⁴.   

It should be noted that at the same time, farming by Arabs in Israel decreased dramatically.  Many farmers fled their homes in 1948 and were not allowed to return, their lands passing to the state.  An additional 40% of private Arab land resources were confiscated by the state, and farmers who retained their land found it increasingly difficult to compete with the modernized high-technology, high-input agriculture being practiced by their Jewish counterparts, a situation made worse by the fact that they were not given the same water subsidies by the government²⁵. 

In the Negev desert, the pastoral Bedouin people were particularly decimated.  It is thought that prior to 1948 there were approximately 70,000 Bedouin living mainly in the northern and north-western areas of the Negev, grazing large herds of livestock and practicing low intensity dry farming²⁶.  Their land holdings are estimated to have been approximately 2 million dunums (200,000 hectares or 2,000 km²)²⁷.  After 1948, only about 11,000 of these people remained in the country, and they were ‘concentrated’ to a small area in the north-eastern Negev known as the Siyag (Fence), their former lands being confiscated by the new Israeli government²⁸.  The Bedouin had not registered ownership of their land with the Ottomans or the British Mandatory government, and so Bedouin land rights remain a hotly contested and largely unresolved issue to this day. 

The fertile lands of the north-western Negev were an important resource for absorbing new Jewish immigrants, and had the potential to produce a lot of food if water could be found to support irrigated agriculture.  Within a few years, some 50 Jewish settlements had been established in the northwest Negev on lands vacated by the Bedouin²⁹, and by 1955 the Yarkon-Negev pipeline had been completed, bringing 100 million cubic metres of water per year (MCM) from the Yarkon River to the Negev³⁰.  By the 1950s, evidence was mounting that the Coastal Aquifer was degrading, as overuse dropped the water level, allowing seawater intrusion; and nitrates originating in fertilizers began to be found in drinking water supplies³¹.  Therefore several wells were closed, and an extra level of inducement was added to efforts to transport water from the relatively water-rich north of the country to the centre and the south. 

In 1956, plans for the construction of the Israeli National Water Carrier, stretching all the way from the Sea of Galilee (known as Lake Tabariyya in Arabic and Lake Kinneret in Hebrew) in the north of the country to the Negev in the south, were finalized and approved³².  The National Water Carrier was completed in 1964, and draws water not only from the Sea of Galilee (400-500 MCM), but also from the Coastal Aquifer (250 MCM) and the western basin of the Mountain Aquifer (350 MCM)³³.  It is not only a supply network, but also an integrated water storage and recharge mechanism whereby surplus water from the north in the winter and early spring can be stored in the underground aquifers, and water from the Galilee can be used to recharge the Coastal Aquifer³⁴.  The Water Law of 1959 entrenched the notion of nationalized water management in Israel, designating all water resources as public property to be managed by the State³⁵. 

These ambitious and innovative water engineering projects undoubtedly allowed the creation of a successful agricultural sector in Israel, and contributed significantly to national food security.  However, they also caused significant environmental degradation to the wetland ecosystems of the Lower Jordan and Yarkon rivers, and a massive drop in the level of the Dead Sea, due to the diversion of the majority of its annual input of water into the Israeli National Water Carrier³⁶.  In addition, these projects caused increased tensions with neighbouring states who shared the water resources which were being so efficiently appropriated by Israelis.  During the early 1950s there were several heated disputes over water engineering projects³⁷.  Israel’s drainage of the Huleh swamp in 1951 infringed on the demilitarized zone with Syria, and initial work on the Israeli National Water Carrier (in 1953) also took place in the demilitarized zone (at Jisr Banat Yaqub), before Syrian objections, US objections voiced by President Truman and a UN ruling forced the project to be moved south onto the shores of the Sea of Galilee³⁸. 

At the same time, the Jordanian government and UNRWA (advised by American engineer M E Bunger) were making plans for development on the Yarmouk River (the main tributary of the Jordan River) in order to improve Jordanian agriculture, and to help resettle some of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan and the Jordanian-administered West Bank after 1948.  A series of dams, storage pools, hydroelectric plants and irrigation channels would store and divert 480 MCM of water per year to generate 28,300 kwH of electricity, irrigate 495,000 dunums of agricultural land in Syria and Jordan, and allow the resettlement of 100,000 refugees³⁹.  Israeli objections (on the grounds of a 10 km frontage on the Yarmouk River in the Yarmouk Triangle demilitarized zone) led to cuts in US funding, and the project was derailed⁴⁰.

It became apparent that a regional agreement was needed if water development on the Jordan River System was to go forward.  The US dispatched a special ambassador, Eric Johnston, to the region to attempt to mediate an agreement between the countries sharing the Jordan River system: Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan.  It is important to note that during the 1950s when these negotiations were taking place, the West Bank was administered by Jordan, and so Palestinian water rights were not explicitly addressed.  The assumption is that water for the West Bank population was included in the Jordanian water quota⁴¹.  After lengthy negotiations, the Johnston Plan was accepted by technical committees from Israel and the Arab League in 1955; however, both the Arab League and the Israeli Knesset refused to formally ratify it⁴².  Nevertheless, the Plan provided a framework for moving forward on water development, and both Israel and Jordan (the main users of the Jordan River waters) undertook to operate within their quotas.  To this day, the Johnston Plan is the closest thing there has ever been to a regional agreement on the Jordan River. 

Allocations of Jordan River System waters under the 1955 Johnston Plan. All figures represent MCM water yr^-1.  Adapted from Naff and Matson, 1984. 

*Israel was permitted to use the 'residue' after the other riparians had extracted their quotas – this was estimated to be in the region of 350 – 400 MCM per year.

The Johnston Plan allowed the finalization of plans for the Israeli National Water Carrier, and the instigation of the Greater Yarmouk Project in Jordan.  The Greater Yarmouk Project was to include construction of canals on both the east and west sides of the Jordan River (East Ghor canal and West Ghor canal), construction of 7 dams to utilize seasonal flow in side wadis, construction of 2 large dams for water storage and hydroelectricity, and the construction of a number of pumping stations, flood protection and drainage facilities⁴³.  However, only the East Ghor Canal (now known as the King Abdullah Canal) was ever built, this being operational by 1966⁴⁴.  The fact that the West Ghor canal was planned to bring water to the people of the West Bank is considered by Palestinians to strengthen their claims to some of the waters of the Jordan River. 

In 1965, in an attempt to thwart the Israeli National Water Carrier (which was opened in 1964), the Arab States began work on a Jordan Headwater Diversion Project, diverting both the Hasbani and Banias Rivers to the Yarmouk⁴⁵.  According to estimates, the scheme would have deprived Israel of 35% of her contemplated withdrawal of water from the Upper Jordan River⁴⁶.  Behind this move was a growing recognition by the Arab States that enhancement of Israel's water supply through the National Water Carrier would also enhance her capacity to absorb immigrants, reducing the chances of return for Palestinian refugees.  Israel responded with a series of military actions, culminating in air strikes deep within Syria in April 1967⁴⁷.  Some commentators believe that the increase in water related Arab-Israeli hostility was a contributing factor leading to the June 1967 War, although it is important to note that myriad other factors were also at play⁴⁸.

Whatever its causes, the 1967 War was to dramatically alter the regional balance of power regarding control of water resources.  By the end of the War, Israel was in control of the Golan Heights (Syrian territory containing the Jordan River headwaters and the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee), and the Palestinian Territories, including the West Bank with its abundant groundwater resources (the Mountain Aquifer system).  Once again, population upheavals altered water use patterns. 

Approximately 131,000 Syrians were expelled from the Golan Heights into Syria, reducing the population from around 147,000 to about 7,000⁴⁹.  The regional capital city, Quneitra, and over 300 other residential locations were destroyed, and only 6 villages remained⁵⁰.  90% of the land was confiscated, military bases were established throughout the area, and the border with Syria was sealed, preventing the return of the Golani people.  This wholesale clearing of the land allowed Israel to assert absolute dominion over the water resources in it. These include the important Banias River, which rises in the Golan and flows down into the Sea of Galilee, and much of the Hasbani River, which rises in Lebanon before joining the Banias and Dan rivers to form the Jordan headwaters.  Also, the removal of over 130,000 water users from their homes and farms freed up a significant quantity of water for Israeli use. 

In the newly occupied Palestinian Territories, there was an immediate exodus of around 250,000 people: 150,000 from the West Bank and 100,000 from Gaza⁵¹.  As in the Golan Heights, water use decreased due to the reduction in population.  In addition, 140 Palestinian pumping stations on the west bank of the Jordan River were destroyed, and were never allowed to be rebuilt⁵².  Thus Palestinians were completely disenfranchised from any access to the Jordan River, a situation that persists to this day.  Palestinian access to the waters of the Mountain Aquifer was also restricted.  A series of military orders quickly proclaimed all water resources in the Occupied Territories to be Israeli State property, granted full control to the Israeli military authority, established a permit system for the drilling of new wells, fixed pumping quotas on existing wells and declared all prior settlements of water disputes to be invalid⁵³. 

The effect of these restrictions was to essentially freeze Palestinian water development in the West Bank.  Between 1967 and 1990 only 23 permits were issued for drilling wells in the West Bank, of which 20 were for domestic use only⁵⁴.  None of these permits were for drilling into the Western Aquifer basin (the most productive part of the Mountain Aquifer system, and the most heavily utilized by Israel)⁵⁵.  In fact, the number of working Palestinian-controlled wells in the West Bank decreased from 413 in 1967 to 300 in 1983⁵⁶.  This was due in part to the drying out of wells caused by the drilling of deeper wells by Israel which caused a fall in the water table, and also because owners could not obtain permits to rehabilitate wells or equipment⁵⁷.  Today there are only 288 working wells under Palestinian control in the West Bank⁵⁸. 

The aim of these Israeli restrictions on Palestinian water use was initially to safeguard the Western Basin of the Mountain Aquifer for use by Israelis.  Even before 1967, this water source was being exploited up to (and possibly beyond) its sustainable limits from wells and bore-holes inside Israel⁵⁹.  Its water was used to supply population centres such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and to swell the volume of water in the National Water Carrier that was being transported to the south to irrigate agricultural land.  Hence Palestinian water development in the West Bank was regarded as a threat to existing Israeli interests, and its restriction allowed the Israeli farming industry to continue to grow and thrive.  

The situation in Gaza was somewhat different because the Gaza Aquifer is downstream of Israel in terms of water use.  Therefore water management in Gaza and associated water quality issues do not seriously affect Israeli interests.  Perhaps for this reason, Israeli restrictions on water development in Gaza were much less stringent than in the West Bank.  The Gaza Aquifer was already being exploited up to its sustainable limit by the existing Gazan population in 1967, and was already degrading due to seawater intrusion and pollution with agrochemicals and untreated sewage⁶⁰.  Between 1967 and 1993, hundreds of permits were issued for the digging of new wells in Gaza, and hundreds more unregistered wells were built, with little interference from the authorities⁶¹.  This situation contributed to further degradation of the Gaza Aquifer, as its natural replenishment rate was outstripped by ever-increasing water abstraction to meet the needs of the growing population.

In the West Bank, the water situation changed radically in the early 1980s, as the election of a right-wing Likud led government under Menachem Begin (1977) ushered in an era of widespread Israeli settlement construction inside the Palestinian Territories⁶².   Prior to this, annexation of land in the Palestinian Territories had largely been carried out for ‘security reasons’ in line with the Allon Plan⁶³, which called for annexation of land in and around Jerusalem to strengthen Israel’s hold on the city, and the establishment of a series of agrarian settlements in the Jordan valley to prevent the return of this strategically important stretch of land to Jordan.  It was not Israeli government policy to build settlements in heavily populated areas of the West Bank, although increasingly during the 1970s, religious nationalist movements (such as Gush Emunim, meaning ‘Bloc of the Faithful’) began establishing settlements outside the bounds of official government policy⁶⁴.  With the election of Begin’s Likud government, this practice became government policy.

This shift was vitally important in ‘popularizing’ the settlement movement, through creating financial incentives for Jewish Israelis to live in the West Bank.  Under the terms of the Drobless Plan, house prices and services in settlements were subsidized, extra social benefits were made available to those relocating to West Bank settlements, and numerous bypass roads were constructed, allowing settlers easy access to Israel without having to pass through Palestinian population centres⁶⁵.  Whereas previously the majority of settlers were motivated by nationalist-religious ideology, now there were also economical incentives motivating people to become settlers.  Thus the number of Israeli settlements in the West Bank grew rapidly; and with them came a number of Israeli owned wells that were drilled inside West Bank territory, along with pipelines, pumping stations and reservoirs, to ensure a constant supply of high quality water to the settlers.  Although a few wells had been drilled before 1981 (with the first being drilled in the south of the West Bank in 1971), most of the Israeli-built supply network in the West Bank was built after 1981 in line with the Drobless Plan⁶⁶.

In 1982, under the aegis of then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, ownership of all water supply systems in the West Bank (with an estimated value of $5 million) was transferred to the Israeli State Water Company, Mekorot, for the symbolic price of one shekel⁶⁷.  By 1995, Mekorot owned and operated 38 wells inside the West Bank, extracting around 60 million cubic metres of water per year (MCM) from the Mountain Aquifer, as well as controlling 13 deep wells owned by the West Bank Water Department (WBWD), an institution established during the Jordanian administration of the West Bank⁶⁸.  These wells were confiscated by the Israeli military authorities in 1978.  The network of pipelines constructed by Mekorot during the Israeli administration of the West Bank also included connections for a number of Palestinian towns and villages. 

This integration of supply networks for Israeli settlers and Palestinians was problematic in several respects from the Palestinian perspective.  Firstly, it discriminated in terms of per capita supply between Israeli and Palestinian localities.  In general, Israeli settlements (regardless of their populations) were supplied by wide, high pressure pipelines; whereas Palestinian towns and villages of much higher relative population were supplied by thinner pipelines that did not deliver as much water.  For example, the Israeli settlement of Kiryat Arba, with a population of 5,500 in 1995, was fed by a 16-inch pipeline and received additional supplies from elsewhere; whereas the Palestinian city of Hebron, with a population of 95,000, was fed by two lines of 12- and 10-inch diameter (giving a much lower volume of water per person)⁶⁹.  Secondly, Palestinians were charged a much higher rate for their water than the settlers.  Settlers received water at $0.40 per cubic metre for domestic water and $0.16 per cubic metre for agricultural water in the early 1990s, while Palestinians paid a standard price of $1.20 per cubic metre for all water⁷⁰.  Thirdly, water was managed in a discriminatory manner.  The WBWD was made responsible for lower level management of the water network.  Its duties included maintenance of water networks, controlling the flow of water to Palestinian towns and villages (by opening and closing supply valves) and billing Palestinian communities.  However, the WBWD was not allowed to close supply valves feeding settlements and had no control over abstraction of water from wells.

In addition to all of these factors, underinvestment in water infrastructure for Palestinian population centres during the period of Israeli administration was chronic.  Palestinians paid the same taxes as Israelis, but taxes paid by Palestinians to the Israeli Administration were not properly invested in the infrastructure of Palestinian towns.  The rate of investment severely lagged behind Jordanian investment on the East Bank and behind Israeli investment inside the State of Israel⁷¹.  By the early 1990s, water and wastewater infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was ‘grossly inadequate’ according to a World Bank report⁷².  Old and leaking water systems were endemic to most major Palestinian population centres, and half of the West Bank villages were not connected to the water network at all, instead relying on untreated spring water and water tankers to ensure their water supply⁷³. 

Thus by the early 1990s, the Palestinian water sector was in a state of disarray.  The agricultural sector had suffered badly due to enforcement of strict pumping quotas, restrictions on rehabilitating existing infrastructure, prohibitions on digging new wells, high water prices and land confiscation and closure.  The domestic sector suffered from high levels of underdevelopment in infrastructure, lack of control over water production sources, discrimination in supply, and water prices that were unaffordable for much of the population. 

During the same period, the Israeli agricultural sector had continued to grow steadily due to constant supplies of highly subsidized water, as well as advances in irrigation technology that allowed crop production to increase even as the water supply remained constant⁷⁴.  Infrastructural development for the domestic sector had proceeded in line with population growth, and in addition, Israeli settlements of both urban and agricultural character had been established throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories, supplied with water through a water network constructed especially for them, and controlled and operated for their benefit by Mekorot. 

Overall water use by Israelis increased until the mid 1980s, in spite of warnings from environmentalists that this situation was not sustainable, and that the quality of water resources was being harmed⁷⁵.  However in 1986-1987 a serious drought raised awareness of water scarcity, and cuts were made in water supply to the agricultural sector, in order to protect the water supply of the domestic sector⁷⁶. Another drought in 1991-1992 reinforced this message and paved the way for further reform in Israeli water management⁷⁷.  These events in the lead up to the Oslo Peace negotiations did not dispose the Israeli negotiating team towards making water concessions to Palestinians that would further reduce the amount of water available for use by Israeli

Following a major popular uprising by the Palestinian population of the occupied Gaza Strip and West Bank (widely known as the First Intifada) which took place from 1988 to 1993, the Israeli government (under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin) entered a phase of negotiation with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, led by Yasser Arafat.  These negotiations involved a limited transfer of power to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA), which became responsible for administering various matters relating to the day to day lives of Palestinians.  It is important to note, however, that Oslo by no means presaged an end to the Occupation, as the Israeli military remained in control of the majority of the Palestinian Territories, and expansion of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land continued, and indeed even increased in rate⁷⁸.

In terms of water, by far the most important agreement was made in 1995 as part of The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (often called ‘Oslo II’).  The 1993 Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) had made only vague references to developing joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian plans for the exploitation of shared water resources and regional water development projects.  In 1994, the Cairo Agreement (sometimes called the ‘Gaza-Jericho Agreement’) placed the water infrastructure in the Gaza and Jericho areas under the control of the PA, giving it authority to "operate, manage and develop" water supply and conveyance systems, with the exception of existing water installations supplying Israeli settlements. Resulting in the establishment of the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) in 1995, the Cairo Agreement also stipulated that the PA would pay for additional water supplied to the Palestinians by Mekorot, along with "the real expenses incurred in supplying water"⁷⁹.  However, neither of these agreements addressed the issues of Palestinian water rights or stipulated how water was to be managed.

In 1995, for the first time, Israel recognized the water rights of Palestinians in the West Bank.  Article 40, Annex III of the 1995 Oslo II agreement states that Israel "recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank" but that "these will be negotiated in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources"⁸⁰.  In the meantime, it was agreed that "existing quantities of utilization" were to be maintained, although an additional quantity of 28.6 MCM water per year was to be made available to the Palestinians during the interim period. The future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank were estimated to be 70-80 MCM of water per year in addition to utilization at the time.

Extraction and utilization of West Bank Aquifer waters according to Annex III, Appendix I, Article 40 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, September 1995.  All figures represent MCM water yr^-1.  Adapted from Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1995).

These quotas were not meant to prejudice the Final Status Negotiations, but rather to act as a guideline for water utilization during the interim period.  Of the 28.6 MCM of water per year to be made immediately available to the Palestinians, Israel was to take responsibility for supplying 9.5 MCM per year, and the Palestinian Authority for supplying 19.1 MCM per year.  The remaining 41.4-51.4 MCM of the water allowed for the "future needs" of the Palestinians was to be developed from the Eastern Mountain Aquifer and "other agreed sources in the West Bank" by the Palestinians themselves. 

Obligations of Israeli and Palestinian authorities to supply additional water to localities in the West Bank according to Annex III, Appendix I, Article 40 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, September 1995. 

In terms of water management, it was agreed that a Joint Water Committee (JWC) would be set up to coordinate development of the West Bank’s water and sewage infrastructure, and that this committee would contain equal numbers of Israeli and Palestinian representatives, with the Israeli military officer maintaining veto power over all agreements, which he used eleven times between 1996 and 2003⁸¹.  No fewer than five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) were to be established, which would operate under the JWC to monitor and police water consumption and development.  The JWC was formally given the power to permit or veto all water and sewage developments on the West Bank. 

In effect, the Oslo II Agreement split the waters of the Mountain Aquifer 80/20 between Israelis and Palestinians, with allowance for some development of additional water supply by Palestinians (from the Eastern Aquifer only), but setting a ceiling on the total amount of water that could be consumed by West Bank Palestinians.  At the same time, no limit was set on the amount of water that could be consumed by Israeli settlers, and no steps were taken to equalize the price of water in Israeli settlements and neighbouring Palestinian communities. 

The JWC provided a mechanism for joint control over water development inside the West Bank.  This referred to water development in Palestinian towns and Israeli settlements, but not to Israeli water use from the Mountain Aquifer that occurred inside Israel.  As discussed earlier, Palestinian water infrastructure was badly underdeveloped in the early 1990s, whereas water infrastructure for most Israeli settlements existing at the time was adequate [*] .  Therefore, the structure set up in Oslo II gave Israelis greater power over Palestinians than vice versa, as Palestinians stood in far greater need of permits for water development projects.

Following the signing of the Oslo Agreements and the famous handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn, contributions from international donors began to pour in to fund the development of the Palestinian water sector.  The main priorities of donors were to build the capacity of Palestinian water institutions (mainly the PWA and the WBWD) to manage, develop, operate and regulate the Palestinian water sector; and to augment water supply to thirsty Palestinian communities by digging new wells and building new pipelines within the limitations of the terms set by Oslo II⁸².  In Gaza, planning and development was focussed around bringing the badly overdrawn Gaza Aquifer back into a positive water balance, preventing further degradation of the sole drinking water supply for Gaza’s population⁸³.  Progress on all fronts was very slow for several reasons. 

Firstly, due to the integration of Palestinian water systems with those supplying Israeli settlements that had taken place during the 1980s, it was not easy to define which parts of the water system Palestinians were to control.  Often, supply valves and pumping stations remained under the control of Mekorot, either because they were serving Israeli settlements or situated inside them⁸⁴.  Many pipelines also remained under Mekorot control, as Palestinians specifically were not allowed to interfere with pipelines serving settlements, many of which had branches that also served Palestinian towns.  In addition, Mekorot retained control over 38 deep wells inside the West Bank.  After 1995, Mekorot began to transfer some of the assets of the WBWD that Israel had previously confiscated (including 10 deep wells) back to Palestinian control.  This transfer is still not complete today⁸⁵.  All of these factors complicated water management.  Further complications were caused by the fact that the WBWD itself had become heavily entwined with Mekorot: its staff were paid through Mekorot, and the General Director was appointed by the Israeli Civil Administration through renewable 6 month contracts⁸⁶.

With respect to developing new resources and infrastructure, the terms of the Oslo Agreement created a system of project planning and permitting that was extremely lengthy and cumbersome.  This, in combination with a high dependency on foreign aid, meant that projects took a long time to go from planning to implementation.  Most projects were planned by the PWA (and later its sister organization, the Project Management Unit), in cooperation with international donors.  Thus most projects had to be approved by both the Palestinian Water Authority and an international donor agency before being submitted to the Israeli coordinator of the JWC, who had the power to throw them out or pass them to the JWC itself.  Following approval by the JWC, projects were passed to the Palestinian Authority for permitting; in addition, those that were to be implemented in ‘Area C’ [†] of the West Bank (over 60% of the land area) also needed approval by the Israeli Civil Authority⁸⁷.  Projects could be thrown out by the Israeli military officer at any stage in this process, even after permits were approved.

A further problem faced by Palestinians in the West Bank was the limitation of new wells to the Eastern Basin of the Mountain Aquifer.  This proved to be extremely problematic, as the Eastern Aquifer is unstable, and there are serious doubts as to whether it can produce the 70-80 MCM of water per year mentioned in Oslo II⁸⁸.  Many of the new wells dug following Oslo II were in the Herodian well field, in the southern part of the Eastern Aquifer.  None of them produced their expected yields⁸⁹, and several recent hydrogeological studies have suggested that pumping should be reduced if the well field is not to become overexploited and degraded⁹⁰. 

Thus it is clear that water development in the Palestinian Territories was heavily limited and circumscribed by the terms of the Oslo II agreement.  While some progress was made, this progress was unsatisfactorily slow, and did not come close to providing Palestinians with the additional water resources and infrastructure that they needed.  Many towns and villages in the West Bank remained unconnected to the water network, and many others suffered severe interruptions in their water supply.  For example, during the summer of 1998, most towns and villages within Hebron received piped water only once every twenty days⁹¹.  In Gaza, water quality continued to deteriorate, to the extent that by the year 2000, 90% of water supplied through the network did not meet World Health Organization drinking water standards⁹².  In 2008, that figure is surely higher. It is worth noting that Oslo II was supposed to be an interim agreement, and was not supposed to prejudice the final status negotiations, which were expected to take place by the year 2000.  Instead, the year 2000 saw the failure of the Camp David talks and the outbreak of the Second Intifada⁹³.   

After the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the election of right-wing Israeli leader Ariel Sharon in early 2001, increased military closures, curfews, checkpoints and roadblocks caused further water supply problems for Palestinians; while Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians spread fear inside Israel.  Water tankers were prevented from reaching Palestinian communities without network access, access to wells and springs was often impeded, maintenance crews were prevented from repairing infrastructure, and removal of solid waste and sewage was obstructed⁹⁴.  In addition, the collapse of the economy rendered many households unable to pay for water, whether from tankers, Mekorot or the PWA.  In 2006, about 71% of the Palestinian population was estimated to be living below the poverty line, with under $2.7 per person per day⁹⁵.  The withholding of tax revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA on various occasions from September 2000 until the present time effectively bankrupted the PA several times, and reduced capacity to manage water, pay technicians and repair infrastructure destroyed by the Israeli army.

In January 2001, the heads of the Palestinian and Israeli delegations to the JWC issued a declaration calling for water infrastructure to be kept out of the conflict and for all possible measures to be taken to ensure the water supply to Palestinian and Israeli cities, towns and villages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In spite of this, an estimated $15 million worth of damages were caused to Palestinian water infrastructure by repeated incursions and settler vandalism between September 2000 and March 2003 alone⁹⁶.  This figure does not include the value of wasted water or damage to the sewage infrastructure.  In addition, on several occasions, Palestinian engineers and technicians were arrested, shot at, and even killed whilst trying to carry out repairs⁹⁷.  Violence notwithstanding, the Palestinian Authority passed Water Law No. 3 in 2002, setting out the principles and objectives of the Palestinian water sector and declaring a commitment to sustainability.  However, implementation of this law has so far proved impossible due to the unstable conditions and continuing violence in the Palestinian Territories. 

In June 2002, Israel began construction of the Separation Barrier around the West Bank, the purpose of which, according to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, is to “prevent the infiltration of terrorists and criminal elements into Israel for the purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks or the smuggling of arms and explosives”⁹⁸.  According to 2003 plans, the barrier was to stretch for some 620 km, annexing approximately 18% of the West Bank to Israel⁹⁹.   In July 2004, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion that the barrier is illegal and should be dismantled.  Israel announced that it would not abide by the Court’s decision; but it did plan changes in the route of the barrier to satisfy requirements of the Israeli High Court¹⁰⁰.  At the time of writing (early 2008), around 450 km of the barrier has been constructed, and its total length is now expected to reach 790 km and annex approximately 10% of the West Bank¹⁰¹. 

In terms of Palestinian access to water resources, the consequences of the Separation Barrier have been dire.  The construction of the barrier’s first phase in the north of the West Bank led to the destruction of 29 wells, 32 springs and 35 km of water pipes, as well as many cisterns and reservoirs¹⁰².  In addition approximately 50 wells and 200 cisterns were isolated behind the wall.  Several communities have been cut off from their only supply of water, preventing irrigation of land and causing widespread hardship¹⁰³.  For example, the farming village of Jayyus in the Qalqiliya district lost 70% of its land (over 8,089 dunums) as well as six of its wells due to construction of the Wall. [‡]

In Gaza, the outbreak of the Second Intifada and subsequent increases in closures and restrictions on materials entering the Strip meant that water development practically ground to a halt.  Shortly after the implementation of Oslo, a 40 km security fence was built around the perimeter of the Gaza Strip, giving Israel absolute control over all goods and commodities entering and leaving the area¹⁰⁴.  Cement, pipes and spare parts for pumping stations were frequently seized by Israeli security forces, making the business of physically implementing any project extremely difficult¹⁰⁵.  In addition, civil unrest and frequent military incursions created a climate where it was difficult for foreign aid workers to maintain a presence inside Gaza, and several projects (including a USAID funded regional desalination plant) were closed down. 

In addition to these difficult development conditions, direct damage to water infrastructure by Israeli military incursions was frequent¹⁰⁶.  Furthermore, fuel blockades and damage to Gaza’s power station resulted in pumping stations and sewage treatment facilities ceasing to function on several occasions.  As a result of all of these factors, water supply to Gaza’s population became very erratic and unreliable.  Partially as a result of this, and partially as a result of high licensing fees for agricultural wells, the number of unregistered wells in Gaza continued to proliferate as people took the issue of water supply into their own hands.  This phenomenon has created further difficulties for effective water management, as the Gaza Aquifer is already overdrawn, and bringing it back into a positive water balance would involve close monitoring of all wells and control over water abstraction¹⁰⁷.

In November 2004, Palestinian president Yasser Arafat died, to be succeeded by the ‘moderate’ Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas in presidential elections held in January 2005.  In August of 2005, under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, all Israeli settlements in Gaza and four West Bank settlements were dismantled and removed¹⁰⁸.  The issue of disengagement was highly divisive both within the Israeli political establishment and the population at large, resulting in a split in the ruling Likud party and the formation of the Kadima party, and in widespread protests.  Nevertheless, the Gaza pullout was implemented without serious violence¹⁰⁹. 

The settlers had previously been using 5 MCM per year of water from the Gaza Aquifer.  Under the terms of Oslo II this water should have been compensated for by the transfer of an equal amount from Israel to the Gazan population (middle governorate and Khan Younis).  However, between 1996 and 2005, this water supply invariably fell short of 5 MCM, dipping as low as 2.5 MCM in 2001¹¹⁰.  Following the disengagement, water infrastructure supplying settlements was left in place in order that Israel might “continue to sell water to the Palestinians”¹¹¹.  Thus water that had been supplied to Israeli settlers was now available for purchase by Palestinians.  Importantly, however, Israel continued to control the perimeter of Gaza, its airspace and its seacoast¹¹².  Thus Israel retained control over all goods entering and leaving Gaza, and obtaining materials for water development projects continued to be problematic.

In January 2006, a democratic election for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was held in the Palestinian Territories.  This was the first election for the PLC to be held since its inception in 1996.  For the first time, the Islamic Hamas movement participated in the election and swept to victory, unseating the incumbent Fatah party by 74 seats to 45.  This development led to a complete unravelling of water development projects in the Palestinian Territories.  First of all, the Israeli government refused to acknowledge the Hamas government.  Fatah ministers also refused to acknowledge the Hamas government and vice versa.  Thus every ministerial post had both Hamas and Fatah delegates, and development within Area A was completely gridlocked.  Even had Fatah and Hamas been able to co-operate, the PA was practically bankrupt: Israel again withheld tax revenues amounting to some $55 million per month from the PA, and the European Union and United States froze aid.  Thus the PA was unable to pay its employees, including the staff of the PWA and WBWD, and all ongoing development projects were frozen.  The JWC ceased to meet, and no new projects could be approved.  In Israeli elections in March 2006, the Kadima party led by Ehud Olmert retained leadership of the Israeli government, campaigning on promises to complete the Separation Barrier by the end of 2006 or early 2007.  

By summer 2006, renewed violence erupted.  Israel launched ‘Operation Summer Rain’, a military offensive on the Gaza Strip involving aerial bombardment and ground incursions.  The Gaza electric station was destroyed, bringing pumping stations and sewage treatment facilities to a standstill and causing hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of damage to water infrastructur¹¹³.  International aid to Gaza from this point on focussed on emergency assistance and not on resolving underlying issues of environmental degradation, which threaten the wellbeing of all residents of the area¹¹⁴.  For example, the development community gave up trying to revive the sewage treatment facility at Beit Lahia; instead, local organizations and international donors tried to expand the capacity of the facility to store untreated sewage.  Unfortunately, due to local, regional and international factors, the development community was not able to create new sewage collection pools in time. The barriers of existing sewage pools exceeded their capacity and burst in March 2007, flooding local communities with sewage and causing five deaths¹¹⁵.

Following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza after ‘Operation Summer Rain’, severe factional infighting broke out between supporters of the rival Fatah and Hamas movements.  In February 2007, a Palestinian unity government was formed, including representatives of both Hamas and Fatah parties under the leadership of Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas.  This fragile truce did not last, and violence broke out once more, leaving Hamas forces in control of Gaza by the end of June 2007 and Fatah forces in control of the West Bank.  In September 2007, the Israeli government declared Gaza a ‘hostile entity’ and, intensifying its blockade of many supplies and spare parts ongoing since Operation Summer Rain, Israel once again began restricting supplies of electricity and fuel, with ramifications for the operation of water and wastewater treatment systems.  At the time of writing (early 2008), this blockade is ongoing. 

In November 2007, Israeli and Palestinian leaders met at a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, hosted by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  This conference was characterized by a stunning failure to address the water issue at all.  No agreement was made pertaining to a quantification of Palestinian water rights, no measures were taken to reinstate communication and coordination over water, and no date was set to discuss joint water management or Palestinian water rights. 

As we move towards the close of the first decade of the 21^st Century, the total population of Israel and the Palestinian Territories numbers approximately 10 million – more than a tenfold increase since the early 20^th century. Today’s population lives a very different lifestyle and, in general, uses more water than people 100 years ago.  Access to and control over water continue to be contentious and highly politicized issues. Access to clean and sufficient water is by no means universal and is not protected as a human right. Pressure on water resources from both overuse and pollution is greater than it has ever been before.  The issue of how to manage, protect and share water resources between Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Arabs, farmers and city-dwellers is now more urgent than ever, yet on the political level, agreement seems as distant as it has ever be